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Abstract
The early involvement of a construction team is increasingly utilised in demanding projects to incorporate versatile expertise in their planning
and to avoid the problems resulting from the low bid practice. Often a solution is to strive for an open process where the target-cost of a project
is set later after a joint development phase involving an owner and a selected team. Parties enter into a target-cost contract which means risk
sharing and leads to taking each other’s views into account better than normally. Cost transparency is expected to ensure efficiency in direct
costs. Yet, the same approach may not be applicable to service providers’ fees, i.e. overhead and profit. That is why some public owners have
resorted to competition where fees are tendered and used in team selection along with capability. In that case, the structuring of fees may have a
decisive impact on incentivising the service providers to strive for an efficient target-cost and, eventually, a successful project. This paper aims
at examining the appropriateness and feasibility of such an approach in ensuring the efficiency of a project based on the experiences drawn
from a unique road tunnel construction project in Finland that adheres to the practice.
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1. Introduction
It has long been the custom in construction to select service providers, especially contractors, solely on the basis of the lowest
bid. The practice has led to risk taking and adversarial relations and created problems in the sector thereby impeding its
development. Pressures to renew the selection come also from a broader cultural change: the value-added strategy is now being
pursued also in construction and more collaborative, relational project practices are increasingly applied in various forms
especially in demanding projects (e.g. Lahdenperä, 2012b). Often this also means the early involvement of key service providers
in the process since the traditional, sequential involvement of the parties does not allow the mutual exchange of information and
collaboration for the benefit of a project.
At an early stage, a project is fraught with too much uncertainty which makes it impossible to estimate costs reliably. Due to
the resulting risk premiums, it is not sensible to fix the price in the early stages of project development. On the other hand,
procurement methods involving competitors in early proposal design (for complete design and full price) forego the opportunity
of collaboration with a client (owner) and other stakeholders. Even if competitive ideas are presented, an owner’s decision
making can be conservative and ignore possible improvements since the evaluation of alternative solutions and ensuring that no
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cheating takes place is often impossible in the middle of a hectic process where a public owner is required to treat all competitors
equally and non-discriminatorily. Thus, collaboration is seldom genuine and profitable, and much potential may be wasted.
As a consequence, the current solution is to strive for an open process where the price (target-cost) of a project is set later after
a joint development phase involving an owner and a selected team. Correspondingly, it is necessary – especially for public
owners – to set constraints and/or a mechanism for price formulation in order to ensure price competitiveness also in the case of
early involvement. Yet, even the targeted open process may not be able to tackle the challenges of corporate overhead and profit
well enough. Therefore, it is not reasonable to ignore cost elements totally even in a selection stage and give a service provider
disproportionate power to price services subsequently. This leads to a complicated set-up and it is uncertain how such an
approach works in practice.
Therefore, this paper aims at increasing the understanding about the possibility and appropriateness of using tendered fee
components together with an incentivised target-cost contract entered in only after the joint development that follows the early
selection of service providers. This is done by delving into the practices and experiences of an infrastructure project where the
arrangement is in use. In this public project, the team selection was based only on the fees tenders of the service provider team
members in addition to the capability assessment. The fees tenders were binding while the direct costs were left to be priced
during the subsequent collaboration.
This paper does not discuss the need for early involvement. It agrees with the conclusions of the corresponding discussion in
Lahdenperä (2014b) which also offers a frame of reference for the presentation. Fig. 1 indicates the rationality of early
involvement and later pricing which constitute the two imprecise critical points for an examination of a fee structure in the case
project that is the core of the paper. Before that, the general features of the project are presented. The appropriateness of the
targeted practice and possible pitfalls are discussed in the last section before the conclusions.
2. Contextual background of the case
2.1. General project characteristics
The project is being carried out in Tampere (Finland) and involves relocating an arterial road that is a major entry road to the
city as well as a bypass for long distance traffic. The aim is to bury part of the road, which currently divides the city and gets
regularly congested, in two 2.3 km tunnels with three lanes in each direction, to widen the rest of it (4 km in total), and to
connect it to the surrounding traffic network by graded interchanges. Besides the city infrastructure, the tunnels will also pass
under the rapids traversing the city at 20 metres below the river bed (for more information, see Alliance Executive Team, 2013;
2014).
The undertaking is being implemented as an alliance project between the public owners, the service providers, the designers
and the contractor. Project alliance is a project delivery method based on a joint contract between the key actors where parties
assume joint responsibility for the design and construction of the project to be implemented through a joint organisation and
share both positive and negative risks, and observe the principles of transparency of information in pursuing collaboration
(Lahdenperä, 2009; Department of Infrastructure and Transport, 2011).
The practice is based on early involvement of the team in joint development that brings together broad and versatile expertise
for the benefit of the project. Selected service providers developed the project and its design in co-operation with the owners
before the actual target-cost (TC) was set and the parties were ready to finally commit to the implementation of the project in
question (i.e. the development phase of Fig. 1).  Thus, TC was agreed prior to
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Fig. 1. Illustrations of the two conceptual fulcrums of the involvement process.
launching construction. Termination would have been possible had the parties not been able to agree e.g. on the TC. In that case,
the owners would have reimbursed the costs of the development work to the service providers.
2.2. Selection procedures
The selection of the service providers (at point n of  Fig.  1)  was  based  on  a  stage-wise  process  where  the  number  of
competition entrants is reduced. Eventually, the two competing teams continued to the final stage involving workshop tasks.
Then, each competitor gave its quotes for fee in a sealed envelope that was opened only after the other evaluation measures had
been completed. The selection was then made based on the joint assessment of the team’s capability and the comparative price
constructed from the quotes and the owner’s own cost estimate items (see 3.1). Thus, the selection criterion was the ‘most
economically advantageous tender’ (Fig. 2).
It needs to be emphasised in particular that capability assessment is a very in-depth process (cf. the project: Lahdenperä,
2012a, Alliance Executive Team, 2014; in general: DTF, 2006). It includes interviews and
Fig. 2. Elements of the service provider selection in the case project.
collaborative development workshops with a psychologist involved in an evaluation – in addition to the more usual criteria of
past performance, the know-how and experience of managers, the project specific narratives of strategies, approaches and
management plans. Thus, a solution-oriented view is required in addition to a basic capability. The cost viewpoint is also
reflected in the selection as a component of capability through a proposed method for the control of economy, presented budget
critique and suggested development possibilities.
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2.3. Target-cost contracting
The core of the commercial model of the project is the TC contract (entered at point o of Fig. 1). It is an arrangement under
which the contracting parties agree an exact TC level prior to construction of the project and, after the completion of the project,
the owners and service providers share the difference between the target and outturn costs – an under-run or over-run. TC
contracts are used in risky projects where the parties find it  reasonable to share the risk, often also with the underlying aim of
improving the collaborative approach. The TC arrangement is a key means of creating common interest and, thus, pivotal to
obtaining a successful project outcome (Love et al., 2011). It is also in line with the idea that service providers should not benefit
too much from possibly biased pricing.
Fig. 3 presents the basic idea of TC contracting in its simplest form. Typically, the TC is agreed to include reimbursable costs
and a fee, as also here. The former consist of direct project costs and other project-specific costs as estimated by the parties (i.e.
project/risk- and market-adjusted, audited direct costs of earlier projects) or tendered by candidate subs in the development
phase. Fee, again, consists of corporate level overheads and a reasonable profit for the service providers. Fee may be based on a
level achieved in earlier projects (cf. DTF, 2006), but sometimes it is based on proponents’ quotes as in the example project. The
former approach does not take into account e.g. the economic situation and the candidates’ eagerness to win the project.
In accordance with common alliancing practice, the commercial model of the case project covers other key performance areas
(i.e. schedule, safety, traffic disturbances, public image, accolades, grey market; Alliance Executive Team, 2013), and the
performance related to set targets also affects the payment to service providers within the limits of a bonus pool.
Correspondingly, part of the cost under-run is allocated to the bonus pool instead of dividing it directly between the parties.
Further, the allocation share profiles vary by zones in relation to the extent of over- and under-run (including limiting service
providers’ share of cost over-run to their fee). For simplicity, these peculiarities are ignored in this paper which focusses only on
the key points of the cost view.
Fig. 3. The basic principles of a target-cost contract arrangement.
2.4. Transparency of costs
The absence of an ordinary price-based selection introduced the need of cost transparency and alternative means to control the
cost efficiency of the project. By and large, the project applied the means generally relied on in cost management in similar
situations (Lahdenperä, 2014b):
x An owner reserves the right to subject final stage competitors to financial audits where the level of costs of realised projects
can be assessed to serve as a benchmark in evaluation.
x Major purchases of a project are to be jointly subjected to competitive bidding later and, at the minimum, prices are to be
market-tested (a contractor may do the work, if competitive enough).
x An independent third-party estimator is involved to assess the appropriateness of a target outturn cost (TC) and the cost items
it consists of (the evaluation of costs and justification material).
x A financial auditor is involved to verify costs incurred and financial management in general (the auditions of financial
systems, a breakdown/limitation of direct and indirect costs, the auditing of reporting and invoicing).
x An owner’s budget, which guides the joint development and pricing of a project is based on two expert estimates completed
independently, is set tight compared to the general cost level in the market.
x An owner has the right to terminate a project for convenience, without default, for instance, but an owner has to pay a fair
compensation for all works and services carried out by then.
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3. Fee structuring in the frame of reference
3.1. Costs and fees of the selection
The dealing with the costs at the time of the selection was as follows – time-wise at point one of the frame of reference (n;
Fig. 1) – when the candidates were required to quote the following (Finnish Transport Agency, 2012):
x Fee percentage of the design companies which consists of the company-level overheads and the expected profit when the fees
of the designers of the main contract are combined according to their work shares.
x Fixed-fee of the contractors which consists of the company-level overheads and the expected profit when the fees of the
contractors of the main contract are combined according to their work shares (allocated stage-wise).
The owner used the same – his own – direct cost estimate in comparing the competitors, which thus became the basis of the
assumed size of the direct costs of the both last stage proponents. Based on data from earlier projects, the owner divided the total
cost estimate into the likely design and construction costs for the calculation of a comparative cost: the share of the design was
expected to be 7% of the total due to the anticipated challenges of the project and by the larger than usual investment in the
collaborative design and the assumed resulting savings in construction. The designers’ fees were calculated on the basis of share
of design (based on tendered percentages) after which all items were added up to arrive at the total comparative cost (Fig. 4). The
selection was made based on the joint assessment of the team’s capability and the comparative price (or the scores derived from
them).
Fig. 4. Formation of the comparative price in the road tunnel project.
3.2. Costs and fees of the contract
After the successful development phase, the parties entered into a TC contract at point two of the frame of reference (o; Fig.
1). All items included in the TC correspond to those included in the comparative price of the selection phase. The main
difference was due to the developed project solution and the corresponding direct cost estimate which replaced the owner’s
estimate used in the selection. The direct cost estimate consists of the accrued costs of development and the cost of all the work
needed to complete the project. The contractor’s fee was included basically as tendered (although now adjusted due to a higher
estimate than the initial one) while the fee of the designer was calculated on the basis of the design part of the estimate using the
tendered percentages.
The beauty of the arrangement is that the fees of different types of members of a service provider team are determined on
different bases. Since the fee of the designer is defined as a percentage and remains so through the development and
implementation phases, it does not drive the designer to minimise design efforts as often happens in traditional competitive
fixed-price contracts. Instead, the designer is eager to conduct additional investigations considered necessary by the other parties
of the alliance team – due to joint decision making the need is decided by the parties together, not by the designer alone. Quite
often the efficiency of a project can be improved by a further investigation of various alternatives thanks to versatile expertise
combined for intensive joint development. Since design cost is typically only about 5% of the total for design and construction, a
minor additional investment in design does not increase the total cost of a project significantly, but it may well result in improved
efficiency by decreasing construction costs considerably. Moreover, a contractor’s participation in design management is also
likely to help avoid the common situation of unnecessary plans being drawn just to be sure.
On the other hand, the fee of a contractor is fixed. Considering a fact that any savings from further planning are usually
realised in construction, the alternative way of fee determination would not work. A percentage fee might incentivise a contractor
to go for a more expensive solution instead of seeking cost efficiency. When a fee is fixed in euros, a contractor has no reason to
oppose more efficient development-phase solutions. Instead, although the incentive for a contractor may not be strong, a more
cost-efficient project can increase a relative fee from a project (which improves a company’s operating margin), a key
performance indicator of any construction company – especially of the big publicly traded ones typically involved in challenging
projects. Naturally, joint development also requires more from a contractor, but considering that their burden is much smaller
than that of designers and that joint development offers a contractor the possibility of ensuring a smooth process, it does not
constitute an anti-incentive either. In the implementation phase, a formal incentive system guides activities.
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It  has  to  be  noted  that  the  basic  structure  of  the  used  TC contract  solution  has  its  roots  in  DTF (2006)  which  considers  it  a
relatively common practice, but does not include the idea of fee-inclusive competition – instead, fees are expected to be
determined by means of establishment audits based on adjusted historical data.
4. Discussion
4.1. The overall approach
The case study sheds interesting light on both the application of a fee component selection based target-cost contracting and
reasons behind its use although considerably simplified from reality. In the service provider selection, the fee was quoted by the
proponents since the determination of a fee without tendering was not considered an option in the case of the major public
procurement and corresponding regulations, i.e. in addition to a fact that the fees may well diverge from the customary figures of
other project delivery systems as is shown below.
It was considered that the most important determinant of efficient project implementation is the early integration of the team
and genuine, collaborative joint development due to the uniqueness and uncertainty of the project. The disturbances to the traffic
flow and the urban neighbourhood with numerous stakeholder issues that had to be solved in the course of the project, posed an
extra challenge. On the other hand, the competitive tendering on the sub-contracts and the price transparency were the important
enablers, besides a fact that the owner’s budget had been considered stringent to start with and there was the real pressure to set a
TC within the budget. These features of the project led the owners to regard the presented practice as the most appropriate
method to ensure the profitability.
Thus, the project and its value system are often much too complex to allow going for the lowest price. Instead, the price aspect
is taken into account in numerous cost management measures itemised above and tendered fee components. The approach may
not guarantee the most advantageous project to an owner, but that cannot be expected from alternative systems either. It is widely
known that although traditional competitive bidding seems to produce the most efficient price for a designed solution, this
solution may not be ideal due to a lack of interaction between key parties, while a price increase during implementation is often
unavoidable and a contract price in itself does not represent a true estimate of a final price. Traditional project delivery systems
underestimate the improvement potential of joint development – or co-creation as it is referred to in other industries – between all
key actors of a project.  The introduced practice aims at correcting this defect.
In other words, it may be better to seek an efficient, perhaps not very tightly priced project solution, than a tightly priced
solution that does not exploit an available development potential and, besides, leads to confrontation between parties. In fact, fair
pricing may even be strength in creating mutual respect and trust resulting in a virtuous circle. Trust strengthens collaboration
which, again, reinforces trust, a critical success factor for a project. The preliminary reviews also seem to indicate that the case
project will become a success (Alliance Executive Team, 2014; Koski and Lahdenperä, 2014), although it is still under
construction. This outcome is largely due to project alliancing in general, but the fee- and capability-based selection and the
corresponding fee structuring surely also contribute. The overall approach as such appears highly functional.
4.2. Fee structuring
Yet, the simple, straightforward solution presented for fee structuring is not perfect either. Since the approach is first and
foremost meant for large, challenging, versatile projects, it is obvious that diverse expertise and equipment are needed to carry
out the project and variation between the plans of competing teams is likely: in some cases a proponent may incorporate
comprehensive resources in the team while another proponent may plan to procure critical resources from the market. That
obviously affects the size of the fee as well, and may skew the comparison of candidates if the work plan and cost estimate are
not broken down accordingly in selection instead of just using the given figures as such. Practice has shown that more in-depth
calculations by the owner (or owner’s advisor) are often unavoidable in the case of price component selection to determine a
representative comparative price (Lahdenperä, 2014a). This approach could also be useful here. It is true that variation between
organisations can alternatively be taken into account in capability assessment (as in the case project), but that involves the danger
of mixing various views if great care is not taken in structuring and balancing the scoring system.
Thus, should there be separate fees for in-house and outsourced work by a contractor? That would eliminate the bias in
comparison and allow the alliance to truly seek the most advantageous option during development without being restrained by a
compromise fee. But can an owner expect a contractor to keep resources available for a project if there is uncertainty about their
use? Other projects can be more tempting especially if the comprehensive fee quoted under competitive pressure is relatively low
and a better return on the investment/equipment is available from the market while subcontracting might result in a higher cost to
an alliance due to the kind of double fee paid. Commitment to the use prior to pricing may also be questionable. In any case,
emphasis on varying fees seems appropriate at least in some instances. Yet, additional fee components and varying direct cost
estimates make the mode more complex and may also cause unexpected bias in the functioning of the model.
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Another  potential  challenge  is  related  to  design  resource  planning  and  the  availability  of  resources  in  synchrony  with  the
needs of an agile alliance process. The challenge may be further intensified by resource allocation problems facing a designer
due to a fee level which tends to be lower in alliancing than in traditional project delivery systems. Above, it was supposed that
the designer, especially, is available whenever necessary since their fee is a percentage which means that all their overheads are
compensated in full as the workload increases. That is true in most cases, but an uncertain/varying work load and a need to
ensure its adequacy also make a designer look actively for other projects. If the fees offered by other branches of the market are
significantly higher, a designer may lose appetite for taking additional efforts in an alliance – naturally, in the implementation
phase there is a formal incentive system in place which largely takes care of this challenge.
As regards the fee level in an alliancing context, there are elements that speak for higher fees (e.g. involvement of senior
people; cost of winning work for designers; uncertainty involved in the project), but they are usually overruled by counterforces
(e.g. strategic benefits like the opportunity for innovation, reputation and staff satisfaction; cost of winning work for contractors;
no threat of legal action; greater control over own destiny; genuine cost estimate and risk contingency; reduced bureaucracy)
(DTF, 2006; project documents). The most important justification for lower fees is that they limit the risk of service providers.
Cost over- (and under-) runs are shared and total loss is often limited to a fee. Competition also produces lower fees.
For these reasons, an owner should ensure that fees are not unreasonably low. Putting too much weight on a fee in selection
may make a system counterproductive also otherwise. A lower fee may reduce the attractiveness of a project and discourage
proponents from applying their best resources. It may also incentivise the supply of a suboptimal project solution that reflects
their lower overhead rather than a lower TC (Department of Infrastructure and Transport, 2011). Since a fee is only a small part
of total costs, and an even smaller factor in an overall value–for-money equation, a balance has to be found between the
valuation of capability and fee in selection – a theme touched upon by Lahdenperä (20014b).
All in all, the challenge is multifaceted and the paper appears to barely scratch the surface of the topic. Yet, it is not supposed
to provide a definitive view, but just introduce the first known application of its kind with possible caveats. The beauty of the
approach as such is not questioned considering its track record and that no alternative procurement approach is perfect either.
Yet, something is still needed to establish it as the choice for the industry.
5. Conclusion
Along with changes in project delivery practices and the increased use of relational contracting, project alliance has proved its
applicability in demanding projects. The early involvement of implementers in collaborative design is a central part of the
solution. As a result, new selection procedures have been developed. One of them uses fee components along with capability
criteria which are considered a minimum required to maintain adequate competitive pressure and, in the case of public projects,
gain acceptance in the eyes of politicians, auditing authorities and the general public. After collaborative design and cost
estimating, parties enter a target-cost contract.
This study reviews the case project where the said practice is being applied. The experiences have been largely positive and
definitely encourage the use of capability-and-fee competition based target-cost contracting also in challenging future projects,
provided that this practice is combined with the principles of transparency of information and an emphasis on the creation of
collaborative, trustful relationships between team members. Some lessons learnt are herein offered to pave the way. Yet, no
detailed recommendations are given based on this initial review. It seems that the approach to be used should be largely
determined by each project and its properties.
Furthermore, the presented approach is not expected to be the answer to all situations and projects. Yet, since projects are
becoming more complex and more constraints and requirements are set by society and stakeholders, the number of projects that
most likely would benefit from this model is growing. It seems to be the model which, at best, efficiently integrates competitive
pressures and genuine joint development for the benefit of a project.
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